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The word “pr ivatisation” was not commonly  used until the ear ly  1980s. W ithin 
a decade, however, not only was it an accepted part of the language in most 
W estern countr ies, more surpr is ingly it featured in the headlines of newspapersin 
W arsaw, Prague, Budapest and even Moscow. The policy of pr ivatisation is  
now a wor ldwide phenomenon affecting both the traditional capitalist countr ies 
and the former communist bloc alike. The programmes introduced by 
governments differ in detail and intensity; nevertheless they are all dr iven by a 
belief that by transferr ing assets from public ownership to pr ivate ownership 
efficiency will improve. The policy of pr ivatisation is  the product of a growing 
disillusionment with state production dur ing the post-war per iod. 
In Britain, where a large pr ivatisation programme was pursued in the 198Os, 
disillusionment took the shape of growing c r itic ism of the nationalised industries. 
These giant industrial organisations had been created mainly  by the 1945-51 
Attlee Governments but had proved difficu lt to manage effectively dur ing the 
1960s and 1970s. However, once se lling state enterprises appeared to win 
wide public support, attention also turned to the c iv il se rv ice and difficu lt to 
pr ivatise welfare se rv ices, notably education and health. In April 1988 the 
Conservat ive Government introduced its  “Next Steps” initiative intended 
eventually to reduce the s ize of the central bureaucracy from 550,000 to less 
than 100,000 (HMSO, 1988). Th is  is  to be achieved by transferr ing personnel 
to quasi-governmental “agencies” which will run former activities on more 
commerc ial lines and perhaps with new senior management brought-in from the 
pr ivate sector. The same Government also tackled what it cons idered to be the 
disincentive effect of “red tape” in education and health by prov iding independent 
budgets for schools  and contracting for health care between fund-holding GPs 
and se lf-governing hospitals. Just as head teachers could now be “budget 
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holders” freed from total dependence on local authority education departments, 
so GPs could operate their own finances buying “best care” for their patients. 
The “Next Steps” initiative, along with the sale of state industries and reforms in 
education and health, were intended to result in a more efficient use of scarce 
resources. 
Unfortunately, however, assessing the value of privatisation and “agency” 
initiatives is hampered by a lack of empirical study of public versus private 
efficiency. Where studies have been undertaken their usefulness is often 
restricted by the problem of making like-with-like comparisons. State activities 
are often monopolies or much larger in scale than their private counterparts. 
Hence there are very few industries where direct comparison can be made. 
Moreover, surveys of the studies which have been undertaken have reported 
mixed results (eg. De Alessi, 1980; Borcherding, Pommerehne and Schneider, 
1982; Millward and Parker, 1983). In particular, in addition to ownership, 
product market competition and the degree of continued state regulation of 
enterprises are identified as significant factors determining managerial behaviour. 
Turning specifically to the UK, there have been very few comparative studies, 
largely because nationalisation created monopolies. Pryke (197 1, 198 1) argues, 
in one such comparison of the private and nationalised sectors, that state 
industry outperformed private industry in the 1950s and 1960s in terms of the 
growth in labour and total factor productivity but performed much less well in the 
197Os, when performance was “third rate, though with some evidence here and 
there of first class standards” (Pryke, 1981, p.257). However, recent data from 
the Treasury (Table 1) suggests that the nationalised industries improved their 
performance dramatically in the mid-1980s and may have again performed better 
than the economy in general in terms of labour productivity growth. It is 
difficult to see what general conclusion can be drawn from this record. A more 
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r e c e n t stu d y  o f th e  ea r l y  e ffects o f th e  1 9 8 0 s  pr ivat isat ions, by  B i shop  a n d  K a y  
( 1 9 8 8 1 , is equa l l y  e n i g m a tic. W h i le g o v e r n m e n t m inisters, th e  p o p u l a r  p r ess  a n d  
m a n y  e conom i s ts h a v e  p r a i s ed  th e  success o f th e  pr ivat isat ion p r o g r a m m e  in  
ra i s i ng  e fficiency,  B i s hop  a n d  K a y  conc l u de : 
“T h e  ove ra l l  p ic tu re  to  e m e r g e ..... is o n e  o f substant ia l  c h a n g e . O u tp u t 
a n d  p r o fits h a v e  g r o w n , ma r g i n s  h a v e  i nc reased ,  e m p l o ymen t h a s  
dec l i ned .  B u t th e  re l a t i onsh ip  o f th e s e  c h a n g e s  to  th e  fact o f p r ivat izat ion 
is n o t i m m e d i a te ly  a p p a r e n t f r om th e  d a ta . T h e  p r iva t ized indust r ies  h a v e  
te n d e d  to  b e  fas te r  g r ow i n g  a n d  m o r e  p r o fita b l e , b u t it s e ems  th a t th e  
c ausa tio n  r u ns  f r om g r o w th  a n d  p r o fitabi l i ty to  pr ivat izat ion,  r a th e r  th a n  
th e  o th e r  way  r o u n d .” ( p p .4 0 - 4 1 )  
( Tab l e  1  a r o u n d  h e r e .) 
T h e r e  is, th e r e fo r e , a  c l ea r  n e e d  fo r  m o r e  e m p ir ical  stu d y  o f th e  e ffects o f 
p r ivat isat ion a n d , equa l l y ,  th e  resu l ts o f r e l a t ed  r e fo rms  wh i ch  h a v e  c r ea t ed  
q u a s i - i n d e p e n d e n t a genc i e s  to  ta k e  ove r  t rad i t iona l  sta te  activit ies. 
T h e  r e m a i n d e r  o f th is  c h a p te r  is c o n c e r n e d , firstly, wi th assess ing  th e  a  p r i o r i  
a r g u m e n ts fo r  p r ivat isat ion a n d  th e n , second ly ,  wi th r e p o r tin g  th e  m a in  resu l ts o f 
a  r e c e n t r e sea r ch  p r o g r a m m e  in to  owne r s h i p  a n d  p e r fo r m a n c e . Th is  r e sea r ch  
m e a s u r e d  th e  extent  to  wh i ch  p e r fo r m a n c e  c h a n g e d  i n  a  n u m b e r  o f o r g an i s a tio n s  
i n  th e  U K  wh i ch  c rossed  b e tween  th e  pub l i c  a n d  p r iva te  sectors o r  u n d e r w e n t a  
sta tus  c h a n g e  wi th in  g o v e r n m e n t.’ In  th e  m a in  on l y  o r g an i s a tio n s  wh i ch  
e x pe r i e n ced  re l evan t  owne r s h i p  c h a n g e s  b e fo r e  1 9 8 2  w e r e  i n c l u ded  so  th a t th e  
“l o nge r - te r m ” e ffects o f th e  c h a n g e  cou l d  b e  assessed  ( the  e xcep tio n  is Br i t ish 
A i rways wh i ch  was  i n c l u ded  fo r  r e a sons  e xp l a i n e d  later) .  Th is  m e a n t th a t wh i l e  
m o s t o f th e  pr ivat isat ions o f th e  1 9 8 0 s  cou l d  n o t b e  i nc l uded ,  th e  r e sea r ch  
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avoided the criticism that it is still too soon to assess the full effects of recent 
privatisations. Also, although these ownership changes are not included, the 
results are still relevant to an assessment of the likely effects of the privatisation, 
“Next Steps” and other related government programmes both in the UK and 
elsewhere. 
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T H E  C A S E  F O R  P R IV A T IS A T IO N  
T h e  case  fo r  p r ivat isat ion c a n n o t b e  safe ly m a d e  sim p ly o n  th e  bas is  o f th e  
ex is t ing k n o w l e d g e  o f pub l i c  ve rsus  p r iva te  e fficiency  p r o v i d e d  by  e m p ir ical  
stud ies .  Ins tead ,  th e  m a in  in te l lectua l  fo r c e  h a s  c o m e  f r om a  p r i o r i  o r  d e d u c tive  
r e a s on i n g  c e n t red  o n  “pub l i c  cho i ce” a n d  p r o p e r ty r ights theo r i es .  T h e s e  
th eo r i e s  h a v e  b e e n  p opu l a r i s e d  th r o u g h  th e  pub l i ca t i ons  o f f r ee  m a r k e t p r essu r e  
g r o u p s  such  as  th e  Inst i tute o f E conom i c  A ffa i rs  a n d  th e  A d a m  S m ith  Inst i tute i n  
th e  U K  a n d  th e  Paci f ic Resea r c h  Inst i tute a n d  th e  C a to  Inst i tute i n  th e  U S A . 
H e n c e  th e y  a r e  n o w  we l l  k n o w n  a n d  th e  br ie fest  o f s umma r i e s  wi l l  suff ice h e r e . 
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Pub l i c  cho i ce  th e o r y  is c o n c e r n e d  wi th th e  n a tu r e  o f dec i s i on  tak i n g  wi th in  
g o v e r n m e n t. Re jec t i ng  th e  W e b e r i a n  n o tio n  o f d is in te res ted  o fficia ls  ac t i on i ng  
d e m o c r a tic dec is ions,  pub l i c  cho i ce  theor is ts  ( e g . N iskanen ,  1 9 7  1 ; B u c h a n a n , 
1 9 7 8 ; M itche l l ,  1 9 8 8 )  a r g u e  th a t g o v e r n m e n t o fficia ls  a r e  just as  i nc l i ned  to  
p u r s u e  the i r  o w n  e n d s  as  o th e r  ind iv idua ls .  D r aw i n g  f r om th e  neoc lass ica l  
m o d e l o f th e  u tility max im is i ng  e conom i c  m a n , th e y  c onc l u de  th a t g o v e r n m e n t 
po l icy is l ikely to  b e  s h a p e d  to  max im i se  th e  u tility o f pub l i c  sector  e m p loyees  
r a th e r  th a n  th e  pub l i c  a t l a r g e . M o r e o v e r , th e y  fu r th e r  a r g u e  th a t po l i t ic ians, 
w h o s e  r o l e  is to  lay d o w n  po l icy a n d  m o n ito r  th e  p e r fo r m a n c e  o f sta te  o fficials, 
a r e  a l so  l ikely to  p u r s u e  the i r  o w n  u tility i n  te rms  o f max im is i ng  th e  chances  o f 
re -e lec t ion .  In  th is  e n v i r o n m e n t th e  p o w e r  o f p r essu r e  g r o u p s , such  as  pub l i c  
sector  t r ade  u n i o n s , is i n c r eased  to  th e  p o i n t w h e r e  pub l i c  serv ices a r e  r u n  i n  th e  
interests o f th e  e m p loyees  a n d  o th e r  spec ia l  in terests r a th e r  th a n  th e  pub l ic .  
T h e  resu l t  is a n  ove r - b l o a t ed  o r  ineff ic ient pub l i c  sector.  
P r o p e r ty r ights th e o r y  c o m p l e m e n ts pub l i c  cho i ce  economics .  In  th is  th e o r y  th e  
sou r ce  o f inef f ic iency i n  sta te  o r g an i s a tio n s  l ies i n  th e  a tte n u a tio n  o f p r o p e r ty 
r ights. In  th e  a r c h e typa l  capita l ist firm  th e  e n t r e p r e neu r  h a s  a  d i rect  in terest  i n  
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the most efficient use of the firm’s resources because his or her income is the 
residual after revenues are deducted from production costs. In joint stock 
companies, which now dominate in capitalist economies, property rights are less 
obvious and ownership and control of the business are divorced. The business 
is ultimately owned by the shareholders but the use of resources is controlled by 
the directors. The shareholders’ wealth, both in terms of dividends and capital 
growth, depends on profits, while managers may earn all or the bulk of their 
income in the form of fixed salaries. Nevertheless, property rights theorists (eg 
Alchian, 1965; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974) argue that the ability of 
shareholders to trade their shares means that managers cannot afford to lose 
sight of the need to manage efficiently and pursue high profits. Where 
shareholders are disappointed by the performance of their management, shares 
will be sold leading to a fall in the share price. This in turn will make the 
company more vulnerable to a takeover bid by alternative management. 
This view of the operation of the private capital market is simplistic, perhaps 
naive, but it does contain a germ of truth even if the takeover threat is not 
reliable (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Lawriwsky, 1984). Certainly in the public 
sector there are no shares to trade and there is no threat of a hostile takeover 
bid. In addition, financing does not require an approach to the banks or the 
equity market through a rights issue. The Exchequer, and hence the taxpayer, 
underwrite all debts of state enterprises. 
Although the public choice and property rights theories have different nuances, 
they obviously complement each other. Together they suggest that economic 
activity undertaken in the public sector will be performed with less productive 
(cost) efficiency than the same activity in the private sector. Also, as public 
sector activities may not charge market prices (eg. education and health), or 
where market prices are set they are set by large monopolies, the public sector is 
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assoc ia ted  wi th less a /lo c a tive  e fficiency.  
S ta te  e n te rp r i ses  te n d  to  b e  p r o tec ted  f r om c o m p e titio n . Fo r  e x a m p l e , u n d e r  th e  
Coa l  In d u s try N a tiona l i sa t i on  Ac t Br i t ish Coa l  h a s  r ights to  m i ne  coa l  i n  G r e a t 
B r i ta in  “to  th e  exc lus ion  ( save  as  i n  th is  Ac t p r o v i d ed )  o f a n y  o th e r  p e r s o n ” a n d  
impo r ts o f coa l  w e r e  restr icted. S imi lar ly, b e fo r e  d e r e g u l a tio n  o f l oca l  b u s  
serv ices by  th e  1 9 8 5  T r a nspo r t Ac t, pub l i c  sector  b u s  serv ices i n  B r i ta in  fa c e d  
on l y  lim ite d  c o m p e titio n  f r om p r iva te  b u s  o p e r a tio n s . It h a s  b e e n  a  l e a d i n g  te n e t 
o f e c onom i c  th e o r y  s ince  A d a m  S m ith  th a t c o m p e titio n  is gene r a l l y  supe r i o r  to  
. 
m o n o p o l y . U n d e r  c o m p e titio n  p r i ces  a r e  r e l a t ed  m o r e  c lose ly to  ma r g i n a l  supp l y  
costs l e a d i n g  to  a l locat ive e fficiency  a n d  surv iva l  i n  th e  c o m p e titive  m a r k e t 
r equ i r es  p r o d u c tio n  costs to  b e  m in im ised.  
F r o m  th is  b r ie f  d iscuss ion  it s h ou l d  b e  c l ea r  th a t th e r e  a r e  two b r o a d  fo r ces  
i d e n tifie d  i n  e c onom i c  th e o r y  wh i ch  l e a d  to  h i g h  a l locat ive a n d  p r o d u c tive  
e fficiency  -  th e  cap i ta l  m a r k e t a n d  th e  p r o d u c t m a r k e t. In  th e  r e m a i n d e r  o f th is  
c h a p te r  w e  a r e  p r imar i l y  c o n c e r n e d  wi th p r o d u c tive  e fficiency.  In  F i g u r e  1  th e s e  
two fo rces  a r e  r e p r e s e n te d  by  th e  cap i ta l  m a r k e t o n  th e  ho r i zon ta l  ax is a n d  th e  
p r o d u c t m a r k e t o n  th e  vert ica l  axis. P o int A  r e p r e s e n ts th e  pos i t i on  o f a  firm  
wh i ch  is d i rect ly c o n t ro l l ed  by  a  g o v e r n m e n t d e p a r tm e n t. It is pol i t ica l ly 
c o n t ro l l ed  a n d  th e r e  a r e  n o  t r a deab l e  sha res ,  h e n c e  w e  w o u l d  e xpec t f r om th e  
pub l i c  cho i ce  a n d  p r o p e r ty r ights th eo r i e s  th a t e fficiency  wi l l  b e  low. P o int B  
r e p r e s e n ts a n  activity u n d e r ta k e n  by  a  g o v e r n m e n t a g e ncy  wh i ch  h a s  s o m e , if 
lim ite d , a u to n o m y  f r om th e  po l i t ica l  p rocess.  E xamp l e s  i nc l ude  th e  t r ad i ng  fu n d s  
set u p  wi th the i r  o w n  fin a n c es  u n d e r  th e  1 9 7 3  T r a d i n g  F u n d  Ac t a n d  th e  m o r e  
r e c e n t a genc i e s  es tab l i shed  u n d e r  th e  “Next  S te p s ” init iat ive. Pub l i c  c o r p o r a tio n s  
( n a tio na l i s ed  indust r ies )  c a n  b e  p l a c ed  a t p o i n t C . They  h a v e  m o r e  a u to n o m y  
th a n  q u a s i - g o v e r n m e n ta l  a genc i e s  a n d  w e r e  d e s i g n e d  i n  th e  i m m e d i a te  p o s t -war  
p e r i o d  to  act a t “a r m ’s l e n g th ” f r om g o v e r n m e n t. The i r  c h a i rman  m a y  b e  d r a w n  
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from the private sector, commercial style accounts are published and employees 
are not civil servants. At the same time, however, government ministers 
intervene in long-term strategy and sometimes in day-to-day management 
decisions. Also, government acts as ultimate guarantor of the industry’s 
finances. 
(Figure 1 around here) 
Points D, E and F correspond to forms of ownership in the private sector. Point 
D includes those private sector firms which are close to the public sector because 
of state funding or a reliance on state contracts. This might diminish incentives 
to be efficient. Point E is the joint stock company; while point F represents 
private ownership where property rights are least attenuated - notably the owner- 
managed firm. 
Turning to the vertical axis, movements upwards correspond to a shift away 
from monopoly towards competition and hence greater product market pressure 
to be efficient. In summary, therefore, Figure 1 provides a mapping of the 
expected relationship between ownership and performance, drawn from the 
theories outlined earlier, and competition and performance. Although for 
convenience discrete points on the horizontal axis have been identified A to F, 
both ownership and the product market are best viewed as continuous 
dimensions. The schema implies the following: 
n changes in ownership involving movements away from political 
control towards private ownership, but with no change in 
competition, will be associated with improved efficiency due to a 
change in the capital market; 
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n  i n c r eased  c o m p e titio n  i n  th e  a b s e n c e  o f a  c h a n g e  i n  owne r s h i p  wi l l  
b e  assoc ia ted  wi th imp r o v ed  e fficiency  d u e  to  a  c h a n g e  i n  th e  
p r o d u c t m a r k e t; 
n  c h a n g e s  i n  owne r s h i p  i nvo lv ing  a  m o v e m e n t away  f r om p r iva te  
owne r s h i p  towa r d s  pub l i c  owne r s h i p  wi l l  b e  assoc ia ted  wi th 
r e d u c e d  e fficiency  d u e  to  a  c h a n g e  i n  th e  cap i ta l  m a r k e t; 
n  l ess c o m p e titio n , e v e n  w h e r e  th e r e  is n o  c h a n g e  i n  owne r s h i p , wi l l  
l e a d  to  a  r e d u c tio n  i n  e fficie n t ?  . 
In  F i g u r e  1  th e s e  m o v e m e n ts a r e  i l lust rated as  X  to  Y , X  to  Z, Y  to  X  a n d  Z  to  X  
respect ive ly.  T h e  la rges t  e fficiency  ga i n s  a r e  l ikely to  b e  assoc ia ted  wi th 
m o v e m e n ts f r om X  to  W , th a t is towa r d s  p r iva te  owne r s h i p  a n d  m o r e  
c o m p e titio n ; wh i l e  a  m o v e m e n t f r om W  to  X , i nvo lv ing  po l i t ica l  c o n tro l  a n d  less 
c o m p e titio n , is l ikely to  l e a d  to  a  s ign i f icant  d e te r i o ra t i on  i n  e fficiency.  
M o v e m e n ts e i t he r  way  b e tween  pos i t i ons  Z  a n d  Y  imp ly  a n  a m b i g uous  resu l t  
b e c a u s e  th e  c h a n g e s  i n  th e  p r o d u c t a n d  cap i ta l  m a r k e t const ra in ts  o n  m a n a g e r i a l  
b e h a v i o u r  c o n flict. 
F r o m  th is  d iscuss ion  th e  fo l l ow i ng  c e n tra l  h y p o thes is  c a n  b e  de r i ved :  c h a n g e s  /i, 
owne r s h i p  a  way  f r om pol i t ica l  c o n tro l  a n d  to  wa r ds  p r iva te  owne r s h i p , espec ia l l y  
w h e n  a l so  assoc ia ted  wi th i n c r eased  c o m p e  W o n , wi l l  l e a d  to  a pp r e c i a b l e  
i m p r o v e m e n ts i n  e fficie n t 3  . It is, o f cou rse ,  p rec ise ly  th is  v iew wh i ch  
u n d e r p i n n e d  th e  po l icy o f p r ivat isat ion i n  th e  U K  in  th e  1 9 8 0 s  a n d  wh i ch  
cur rent ly  d r i ves  th e  po l icy i n  e a s te r n  E u r o p e . T h e  emphas i s  g i v en  to  p r o m o tin g  
c o m p e titio n  a l so  h a s  imp l ica t ions fo r  cu r ren t  d iscuss ion  o f th e  r o l e  o f r e g u l a tio n  
o f p r iva t ised pub l i c  u tilitie s  (Pa rke r ,  1 9 8 9 ) . T h e  p r o p e r ty r ights a n d  pub l i c  
cho i ce  th eo r i e s  s u g ges t th a t p r ivat isat ion o f monopo l i e s  wi l l  l e a d  to  s o m e  
1 0  
efficiency gains (though these gains may mean higher profits rather than lower 
prices), but the largest efficiency gains will occur where privatisation is 
associated with more competition. Where “natural monopoly” prevents efficient 
competition, the regulatory structure should create managerial incentives similar 
to those which exist under competition. 
11 
THE ORGANISATIONS STUDIED AND THE PERFORMANCE MEASURES USED 
To test the central hypothesis that ownership affects economic performance, ten 
organisations were selected covering a number of possible moves between the 
public and private sector (nationalisation and privatisation) and within the public 
sector (from government department to trading fund or public corporation 
status). Two of the organisations underwent two ownership changes in the 
period studied, hence twelve relevant status changes were studied. The ten 
organisations, their status changes with the relevant dates, and the predicted 
effect on performance are summarised in Table 2. 
(Table 2 around here) 
Four nationalisation/privatisation cases were included - British Aerospace, Rolls 
Royce, British Airways and the National Freight Corporation (NFC). British 
Aerospace was created on the nationalisation of the UK’s two largest aerospace 
companies - the British Aircraft Corporation, Hawker Siddeley (Aviation and 
Dynamics) - and the smaller Scottish Aviation in 1977. Four years later the 
corporation was privatisedP Rolls Royce was bought by the state in February 
1971 following a financial crash associated with major cost over-runs in the 
development of the RB211 engine. The company was privatised in 1987, 
though this event came too late to be included in the study. The decision to 
privatise British Airways was made in 1980 but had to be postoned until 1987, 
mainly because of legal disputes in the USA relating to the collapse of Lake 
Airways (British Airways along with Pan Am and TWA was accused of anti- 
competitive practices), and later because of the need to renegotiate the Bermuda 
II agreement which regulates traffic on the vital Atlantic routes. However, 
because the management were aware that privatisation was imminent, we might 
12 
expect to find a large growth in efficiency between 1980 and 1987. Lastly, the 
National Freight Corporation was established as a state holding company for the 
nationalised freight and related undertakings in 1969. It was privatised in 
February 1982 in a celebrated worker and management buy-out. 
The movements within the public sector which were studied included the Royal 
Mint, the HMSO (the government’s stationery office), the Royal Ordnance 
Factories, London Transport and the Post Office. The Royal Ordnance factories, 
the Royal Mint and the HMSO had for a long-time been run within government 
departments, but with a view to making them operate more commercially were 
given trading fund status in 1974, 1975 and 1980 respectively. Under trading 
fund status, management are still accountable to the Minister and the employees 
remain civil servants. The organisation, however, has its own accounts and is 
financed by trading receipts instead of parliamentary votes. This provides for a 
greater degree of financial autonomy and managerial independence than exists 
when activities are directly run by government departments. 
London Transport, which manages the capital’s bus and underground services, 
was one of Britain’s first public corporations when established in 1933. In the 
post-war years it had a chequered history of ownership though it always 
remained a public corporation. From 1963 it was responsible to central 
government but in 1970 it became accountable to the Greater London Council 
which had been established five years earlier. This change resulted in fourteen 
years of periodic and extensive political intervention in the management of 
London Transport, notably in relation to pricing policy. Following the decision to 
abolish the GLC, the corporation once again became accountable to central 
government in 1984 and its management were expected to operate more 
commercially. Given the extent of political intervention in London Transport 
during the GLC years, we would expect performance to have deteriorated after 
13 
1970 and improved again after 1984. Lastly, the Post Office postal and 
telecommunications businesses were separately studied. The Post Office moved 
from being a government department to public corporation status in 1969, again 
with a view to raising efficiency. 
Performance changes were measured using three sets of measures. The reason 
for using different measures was to check for “measurement bias”, ie the 
possibility that performance might have improved using one measure but not 
using another (something found to be true for many of the organisations studied). 
The three sets of performance measures were: 
n Labour and total factor productivity. Four year averages were 
used for before and after the dates of the status change to capture 
“lead and lag” effects. There is always the possibility that 
performance might have improved ahead of the date of the status 
change or that there might have been a delay caused by 
reorganisation costs before performance responded. Longer 
periods were not used because these might have reflected 
performance changes unrelated to the ownership change. To 
control for the effects on performance caused by general changes 
in the macro-economy, notably the business cycle, changes in the 
organisation’s productivity were compared with changes in 
productivity in the same periods for the whole of the UK economy, 
public corporations and, in the case of manufacturing 
organisations, UK manufacturing industry. 
Labour productivity was measured by the relationship between a 
weighted index of physical quantities of output and the volume of 
14 
labour input. In the absence of reliable information on average 
hours worked, the average number of employees was used as the 
labour input. Where no adequate physical output measure was 
available, this was approximated by deflating the value of output 
by price deflators, including an own industry deflator. Using more 
than one price deflator provided a test of the sensitivity of the 
results to the precise deflator used. 
Total factor productivity was defined as: 
TFP = 
Weighted index of physical quantities of output 
Total expenditure on inputs/Weighted index of input prices 
Again, where there was an absence of quantity data physical 
output was approximated by applying relevant price deflators to 
value of output figures. 
n Employment functions. Various employment functions were tried 
though the Ball and St Cyr (1966) function usually gave the best fit 
and had the added advantage of simplicity. Employment functions 
relate the amount of employment to a series of independent 
variables and in the Ball and St Cyr function the relationship is 
expressed in general form as: 
N = f(q,tJQ 1 
where N is employment, q is output, t is a time trend 
and Nt-1 is a lagged dependent variable from which 
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C  
th e  s p e e d  o f ad j us tmen t  o f e m p l o ymen t to  its 
o p tim a l l eve l  c a n  b e  ca lcu la ted.  T h e  e q u a tio n  is 
e xp r essed  i n  n a tu r a l  l oga r i thms.  
By  i n t r oduc i ng  a  b i na r y  ( d u m m y )  va r i ab l e  fo r  th e  owne r s h i p  
c h a n g e , it was  poss i b l e  to  test w h e th e r  owne r s h i p  h a d  a  
sta tistica l ly s ign i f icant  e ffect o n  th e  e m p l o ymen t re la t i onsh ip .  T h e  
b i na r y  va r i ab l e  was  a pp l i e d  i n  b o th  shift a n d  s l o pe  fo rms  so  th a t 
th e  re l a t i onsh ip  tes ted  was:  
Ni  =  a + b iV i+ c X V i + D + m i  
w h e r e  V i is a  vector  o f va r iab les ,  n o tab l y  o u tp u t, th e  tim e  
t r end  a n d  th e  l a g g e d  d e p e n d e n t va r i ab le ,  X  is a  s l o pe  shift 
d u m m y  va r i ab l e  fo r  sta tus  c h a n g e  a pp l i e d  to  V , D  is a n  
in te rcept  shift d u m m y , a n d  m i is th e  usua l  sto chas tic e r r o r  
te r m . 
W h e r e  e m p l o ymen t e fficiency  r o se  fo l l ow i ng  th e  sta tus  c h a n g e  th e  s i gn  o n  th e  
d u m m y  va r i ab l e  wi l l  b e  n e g a tive  s u g ges tin g  less e m p l o ymen t to  o u tp u t; th e  s i gn  
wi l l  b e  pos i t ive if e m p l o ymen t e fficiency  fel l. T h e  u s e  o f a n  e m p l o ymen t 
fu n c tio n  p e rm i tte d  a n  assessmen t  o f th e  l o n ge r - te r m  e ffects o f o r g an i s a tio n a l  
sta tus  c h a n g e s  o n  th e  re l a t i onsh ip  b e tween  e m p l o ymen t a n d  o u tp u t th a n  
p r o v i d e d  by  th e  l a b o u r  p r o d u c tivity ca lcu la t ions.  It a l so  p e rm i tte d  th e  
i n t roduc t i on  o f o th e r  facto rs  wh i ch  m ight  h a v e  impac te d  o n  th e  re la t i onsh ip .  
8  F inanc ia l  R a tios. A  se r ies  o f sta n d a r d  fin anc i a l  r a tio s  w e r e  
ca lcu la ted  fo r  e a c h  o r g an i s a tio n . A p p r o p r i a te  ad j us tmen ts  w e r e  
m a d e  to  th e  r e p o r te d  a c c oun tin g  fig u r e s  to  c rea te  a  cons is tent  
se r i es  ove r  tim e  w h e r e  th e r e  h a d  b e e n  c h a n g e s  i n  a c c oun tin g  
1 6  
practice. The following ratios were calculated: 
rate of return before interest and tax on net assets 
(profitabilityI 
debts to turnover and stock to turnover (use of working 
capital); 
sales to net fixed assets (use of capital stock); 
labour’s share in expenditure and value added per employee 
(use of labour). 
Profitability is usually taken to be the key financial ratio to which 
the others contribute. However, using profitability alone is 
unsatisfactory when considering organisations which spent some 
or all of their time in the public sector. In the public sector goals 
other than profitability are often considered as, or more, important. 
Performance measured simply in terms of the rate of return on net 
assets could, therefore, simply reflect changes in objectives. 
The ratios were calculated using four year averages for before and 
after the status change and were tested using a simple covariance 
model which took the form: 
Vit = a+bti+bXti+D+mi 
where yt is a vector of financial ratios and once 
again t is a time trend, X is a binary variable in slope 
17 
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fo r m  a n d  D  i n  shift fo r m  to  c a p tu r e  th e  e ffect o f th e  
owne r s h i p  c h a n g e . O th e r  facto rs  a ffec t i ng  fin anc i a l  
p e r fo r m a n c e  a r e  r e flec ted  i n  th e  tim e  t rend,  t. 
1  
R e tu r n i n g  to  th e  o r g an i s a tio n s  stu d i e d , on l y  th r e e  -  th e  H M S O , Br i t ish A e r o s p a c e  
( n a tiona l i sa t i on )  a n d  L o n d o n  T r a nspo r t (post - l  9 8 4 )  h a d  a pp r e c i a b l e  c h a n g e s  i n  
the i r  c o m p e titive  e n v i r o n m e n t a t a r o u n d  th e  tim e  o f th e  sta tus  c h a n g e  wh i ch  
m ight  h a v e  impac te d  o n  p e r fo r m a n c e . In  1 9 8 2  th e  H M S O  lost its m o n o p o l y  o f 
sta tio n e r y  a n d  o th e r  supp l i es  to  g o v e r n m e n t d e p a r tm e n ts. T h e  n a tiona l i sa t i on  o f 
th r e e  a i r f r ame  m a n u fac tu re rs  to  c rea te  Br i t ish A e r o s p a c e  r e d u c e d  c o m p e titio n ; 
wh i l e  i n  th e  case  o f L o n d o n  T r a nspo r t, f r om 1 9 8 4  a n  i nc r eas i ng  n u m b e r  o f 
L o n d o n  b u s  r o u tes  w e r e  sub j ec ted  to  c o m p e titive  te n d e r . 
I- 
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RESULTS 
Space precludes the inclusion of all of the statistical results, but the main ones 
are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 (for fuller details see Parker and Hartley 1991 a 
and 1991 b and Hartley, Parker and Martin, 1991). Table 3 provides a selection 
of results from the employment function tests; Table 4 includes the figures on 
labour and total factor productivity adjusted for changes in productivity in the 
whole economy, public corporations and the manufacturing sector; while Table 5 
is a summary of the results of the significance tests on the financial ratios. In all 
cases dates refer to accounting year ends. For example, for the HMSO 1977-80 
refers to the accounting years year ending 31 March 1977 to 31 March 1980. 
(Tables 3, 4 and 5 around here.) 
Inevitably, using a number of financial ratios meant that not all of them pointed in 
the same direction. To provide a guide, albeit crude, to the overall impact, each 
of the financial ratios was weighted equally to derive the “net total” column. An 
improvement in any ratio was given a value of one; where it deteriorated a value 
of -1. A net total greater than zero means that more financial ratios improved 
rather than deteriorated; and vice versa for a negative total. Changes in the 
stocks and debtors ratios need to be treated with special care as the direction of 
change associated with an improvement in performance is not certain. Lower 
stocks and debtors ratios may not always be desirable. Too few stocks might 
mean an inability to meet new orders. Fewer debtors could result from pestering 
customers to pay to the point where future sales are lost. An alternative view is 
to interprete any change in these ratios, in whatever direction, as evidence of 
improved performance. The final column in Table 4 adopts this approach. It is 




implying an equal weighting of the ratios and, therefore, the figures must be 
interpreted with care. It can be argued that profitability is the key ratio, though as 
already explained there is a problem in using profitability alone when measuring 
changes in performance for organisations which spent at least some of their time 
in the public sector. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in five of the cases 
profitability rose following the status change (though for Rolls Royce contrary to 
expectation) and for none of the organisations did it decline. 
In the cases of British Airways and the National Freight Corporation the 
performance measures showed evidence of improvement. The anticipation of 
privatisation and actual privatisation respectively seem to have had the desired 
effect. The British Airways results are unambiguous. In terms of the 
employment equation for the NFC, the inclusion of a slope dummy on output 
indicates that before privatisation the output coefficient was insignificant but 
became significant following privatisation. Along with the expected negative and 
significant shift dummy, this implies that privatisation was associated with a 
large increase in employment efficiency. In Table 4, three time periods are 
reported for the NFC with the period 1980 to 1983 reflecting the “anticipation 
effect” of impending privatisation in 1980/81 and the company’s first nineteen 
months in the private sector. The financial ratio results for the NFC are also 
supportive of the view that privatisation improved efficiency if it is accepted that 
any changes in the stocks and debtors ratios suggest a performance change. 
Turning to British Aerospace, the Ball and St Cyr employment function provided a 
poor fit and instead a function based on the Treasury employment function is 
reported (for more on this see Parker and Hartley, 1991 a, p.413). The shift 
dummies proved to be positive as expected for nationalisation but contrary to 
expectation for privatisation. However, the interaction terms on output suggest 
an improvement in employment efficiency, especially after privatisation in 198 1. 
20 
In other words, the coefficient on output was somewhat higher during the period 
of nationalisation implying a greater increase in employment was needed to 
produce any given increase in output. This result is also born out by the figures 
for labour and to a lesser extent total factor productivity in Table 4. Labour 
productivity growth was worse during the four years of nationalisation than in 
the earlier or following periods of private ownership. The total factor 
productivity results are more mixed, but the slight improvement in relation to the 
performance of public corporations and UK manufacturing during the period of 
nationalisation is a feature of the very poor productivity record of public 
corporations and manufacturing in these years. Similarly, the sharp recovery in 
UK manufacturing productivity in the early 1980s accounts for the deterioration 
in relative total factor productivity performance after 1981. The financial ratio 
results, however, do not confirm that nationalisation lowered performance and an 
assessment of the effects of privatisation depends upon the interpretation 
placed on the deterioration in the stocks ratio. 
Owing to lack of reliable data, for the Royal Mint financial ratios could not be 
calculated. But in terms of labour and total factor productivity growth the 
Mint’s transfer from government department control to trading fund status seems 
to have produced the anticipated efficiency gains. A Peel and Walker (1978) 
formulation of the employment function, which includes real wages as an 
independent variable, proved more satisfactory than the Ball and St Cyr equation, 
though there was evidence of multicollinearity between output and the lagged 
dependent variable so the latter was omitted. The results suggest that the 
movement to trading fund status led to an improvement in efficiency as reflected 
in the negative sign on the shift dummy, though this was partially offset by an 
increase in the coefficient on output, implying a one-off efficiency gain at the 









- I I ,  
In the case of the Royal Ordnance Factor ies, contrary to expectation labour 
productiv ity  growth seems to have declined following the granting of trading 
fund status and, with the exception of the compar ison with trends in UK 
manufacturing, total productiv ity  growth also appears to have deteriorated. 
Again because the mid-to late 1970s was a per iod of ve ry  poor growth in 
manufacturing total factor productiv ity  in the UK, this may explain why the 
performance of the Royal Ordnance Factor ies looks more respectable when 
contrasted with this indice. There was also no s ign of the expected 
improvement in efficiency as measured by the employment function results, 
where the coefficient of the sh ift dummy is  positive rather than negative. On ly  
us ing the financial ratios could a performance improvement be identified (Table 
5). 
Turn ing to the HMSO, immediately after becoming a trading fund the 
performance in terms of comparative labour and total factor productiv ity  seems 
to have worsened. Tak ing the per iod after 1982, however, when the HMSO 
faced competition for government contracts, labour productiv ity  seems to have 
recovered though the performance in terms of total factor productiv ity  remained 
disappointing. W ith regard to the financial ratios, there was either no ev ident 
change in performance or a s lightly  improved performance depending on the 
interpretation placed on the deterioration in the debtors ratio. The employment 
function result reported takes 1982 as the date of the status change and the 
result suggests improved performance. 
The results  re lating to the public corporat ions were also mixed. The 
nationalisation of British Aerospace has already been discussed. The transfer of 
the postal and telecommunications businesses from government department 
control to a public corporat ion in 1969 led to improvements in labour productiv ity  
and perhaps also to some improvement in terms of the financial ratios (though 
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once again, for telecommunications this depends on the interpretation placed on 
the higher debtors ratio), but the results using the other measures were more 
confused. For telecommunications, the Ball and St Cyr employment function 
provided a poor fit, therefore the lagged dependent variable was omitted, in 
which case longer-term employment efficiency did seem to improve after the 
introduction of public corporation status (but see Parker and Hartley, 1991a, 
p.413 for reservations). For the postal service, the status change dummy 
variable in the employment function was statistically insignificant at the lOoh 
level or better. 
At first blush perhaps the most surprising results were those for Rolls Royce. 
Instead of performance deteriorating as expected following the state takeover, it 
actually improved irrespective of which measure is used. It is interesting to 
note, however, that labour productivity, in particular, actually fell in the mid- 
1970s. Between 1975 and 1978, for instance, the decline was between 1.4O/6 
and 3.7% per annum depending on the precise measure used (Parker and Hartley, 
1991 a, p.410). This may mean that the 1971 financial crash acted as a short- 
term stimulus to reorganise and cut waste, but that within a few years state 
ownership was having the expected deleterious effect on performance. 
Lastly, London Transport remained a public corporation throughout the period 
studied but was subjected to more political intervention during its years under 
GLC control between 1970 and 1984. The expectation was that performance 
would have deteriorated after 1970 and improved from 1984. Our study 
suggests that the establishment of GLC control did not lead to an immediate 
performance deterioration except in terms of total factor productivity. However, 
the transfer from GLC control in 1984 CM lead to the expected efficiency 
improvements. This result may be explained by the fact that political 
intervention in London Transport by the GLC intensified in the late 1970s and 
23 
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The research reported in this chapter was concerned with testing a central 
hypothesis derived from the public choice and property rights literatures that 
changes in ownership status away from political control towards private 
ownership, especially when also associated with increased product market 
competition, lead to improved performance. This was tested by studying ten 
organisations which underwent twelve relevant status changes either within the 
public sector or involving movements between the public and private sectors. 
The results were mixed and often varied depending on the precise performance 
measure used. Table 6 provides an overall summary of the results with the 
organisations listed according to the extent to which the results supported the 
central hypothesis. The following are the main conclusions6 
B Three cases of privatisation were studied involving British Airways, 
the NFC and British Aerospace. The results for British Airways 
and the NFC were strongly supportive of the central hypothesis, 
while those for British Aerospace were only slightly less 
supportive. In other words, privatisation seems to have led to the 
expected performance improvement. 
8 The results for those organisations which changed status within 
government were more confused. In the case of the trading 
funds, the performance of the Royal Mint and, on the whole, the 
HMSO improved, but the results for the Royal Ordnance Factories 
were disappointing. The granting of public corporation status to 
the Post Office in 1969 may have led to some improvement in 
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labour productivity in both the postal and telecommunication 
businesses, and perhaps a marginal improvement in terms of the 
financial ratios, but in terms of total factor productivity the result 
was unclear. 
The results for the nationalisation cases were perhaps the most 
surprising. There was some evidence of a worsening in the 
performance of British Aerospace after 1977 in terms of the use of 
labour but not necessarily in terms of the other performance 
measures. In the case of Rolls Royce, initially state ownership led 
to an improvement in performance, though performance 
deteriorated later. The experience of London Transport following 
the abolition of the GLC and the the imposition of a clearer 
commercial objective, supports the view that political control 
reduces efficiency. 
In three cases, the HMSO, London Transport after 1984 and the 
nationalisation of British Aerospace there was a change in 
ownership status and an apparent change in product market 
competition. The HMSO and London Transport faced more 
competition, while the merger of three aerospace companies within 
the UK to form British Aerospace reduced domestic competition. 
According to the schema in Figure 1, the coupling of a change in 
ownership with a change in the competitive environment should 
lead to significant changes in performance and this was broadly 
confirmed in two of the cases. The HMSO’s performance 
improved more noticeably after 1982 when it lost its monopoly of 
public sector supplies and London Transport registered a clear 
improvement in performance after 1984. The British Aerospace 
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results were less obvious, but there was no overwhelming 
evidence of a deterioration in performance. This might, however, 
be explained by the fact that the corporation worked in an industry 
heavily dependent on state aid and government contracts so that 
even before 1977 there was only limited competition between the 
constituent companies of British Aerospace. 
It is always dangerous to draw firm conclusions from what was clearly a small 
sample. However, the results do not contradict the view that privatisation 
improves performance and they provide some support for the argument that 
political intervention in an organisation’s operations damages efficiency. They 
seem to bear out Stephen Littlechild’s warning some years ago in relation to 
organisations which retain some government ownership, that “..... as long as 
ultimate control lies with government, one cannot realistically hope to avoid all 
the problems....” (Littlechild, 1981, p. 14). The introduction of trading fund or 
public corporation status within government had a less reliable effect on 
performance than outright privatisation in the cases studied. 
The scheme in Figure 1 performed well. Longer movements along the horizontal 
axis (public to private ownership) did seem to be associated with more noticeable 
performance changes. Also, the independent effect of product market 
competition on efficiency seems to have been born out. This conclusion has 
obvious implications for programmes which introduce agency status within 
government, such as the “Next Steps” initiative, as well as for the on-going 
debate about the merits of public and private ownership, especially where there 
is continuing state regulation. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The research was funded by the ESRC (Project number E 0925006) as 
part of its Management in Government Initiative. I would like to 
acknowledge the contribution of my co-researchers, Professors Keith 
Hartley and Andrew Dunsire, and the statistical assistance provided by 
Bob Lavers and Stephen Martin. As far as the contents of this chapter 
are concerned, the usual disclaimer applies. 
2. This, of course, may not be true where there are appreciable scale or 
scope economies. However, for the purposes of the remainder of this 
chapter this need not detain us. 
3. Figure 1 and the reasoning on which it is based also implies that 
movements with/i, the private sector (eg D to F or F to D) will be 
associated with changes in efficiency. However, this chapter is 
concerned only with agency status within government and movements 
across the public-private boundary. 
4. Although the government retained 48.4% of the shares until May 1985, 
1981 can be taken as the date of privatisation because from that date the 
government ceased to intervene in the affairs of the company. 
5. Calculating profitability before interest charges removes the effect of 
different types of financing. In particular, public sector activities have no 
equity, hence privatisation, by substituting equity for loan stock, reduces 
the interest charge and increases post-interest profitability. Taking post- 
interest figures would introduce a bias in favour of the profitability results 
28 
after privatisation or before nationalisation. 
6. In interpreting the results it would be useful to know more about the 
history of the organisations and their internal management with a view to 
explaining why it is in some cases performance changed as expected but 
in other cases it did not. This might permit answers to an important 
question. What are the internal organisational changes that lead to 
improved efficiency? In other words, what are the critical factors for 
success when ownership changes? Clearly, changing ownership cannot 
in itself change performance, something must change within the 
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1. The ordinary least squares (OLS) method was adopted for the employment and 
fmancial ratio tests. In undertaking the statistical analysis, due attention was paid to 
the possibility that the results were unreliable because of the existence of 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Multicollinearity leads to large standard errors of the regression coefficients, though 
given that in this study, the primary objective was to identify differences in 
organisational efficiency, collinearity was of limited importance provided it did not 
affect the dummy variables. Its existence was detected by the use of a correlation 
matrix, which picks up collinearity between pairs of variables (though it is less reliable 
in detecting collinearity between three or more variables where no two alone exhibit 
high correlation). In only two cases reported below was there evidence of high 
collinearity impacting on the results (see Parker and Hartley, 1991a) and to overcome 
it, one of the variables was removed. 
Heteroscedasticity makes the OLS estimators inefficient, ie. they no longer have 
minimum variance. This tends to be more of a problem, however, in cross-sectional 
studies rather than where time series data are used as in this study. Nevertheless, in an 
effort to ensure that it was not a factor in the results, the residuals were plotted - no 
significant heteroscedasticity was discovered for the equations reported below. By 
contrast, autocorrelation among the disturbances is more common in time series data 
(though less so in annual data as used here). If it exists, once again the OLS 
estimators are no longer efficient so that the tests of significance are less powerful. A 
standard method of detecting autocorrelation is the Durbin-Watson h statistic, however 
this cannot be used for autoregressive models. Thus it could be used for the financial 
ratio tests but not in the employment function study. The Durbin h statistic has been 
developed for use in autoregressive models but it is only asymptotically efficient and 
30 
therefore should not be used for small samples. There appeared to be no readily 
accepted test for autocorrelation for small sample autoregressive functions, so detecting 
of first-order autocorrelation was undertaken by plotting the residuals. Where there 
was evidence of autocorrelation, a first-difference transformation was undertaken using 
the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure. 
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B C D E F 
Capital Market 
Efficiency Gain 
TABLE 1: PERFORMANCE OF NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES 
Labour Productivity 
(annual % change) 
1979/80 0.1 0.7 0.9 
198018 1 -0.5 -3.8 -5.3 
1981182 6.5 3.5 6.9 
1982183 2.4 4.0 6.4 
1983184 7.2 4.0 8.3 
1984185 6.0 2.9 4.8 
1985186 9.6 1.1 2.4 




Source: Treasury, Economic Progress Report, No 193, December 
1987, p5. 
TABLE 2: ORGANISATIONAL STATUS CHANGES 
Type of change Organisation Date Prediction from 
central hypothesis 
of change in 
PM-= 
Govcmmcnt department 
to trading fund 
. 
Government dqmmcnt 
to public corporation 
Public coqmation 






(i) Public limital 
company to public 
ownership 
(b) Public aqkation 

























July 1974 Improvcmcnt 
April 1975 ImprovcIncnt 
April 1980 Improvuncnt 
April 1969 Improvement 
April 1969 Improvcmmt 
Jan 1970 DCtCIiOratiOIl 











TABLE 3 THE EMPLOYMENT FUNCTION RESULTS 


















































































-0.09 * * 
(4.12) 
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T A B L E  3  N o tes  
(1 )  R 2  is ad j us t ed  fo r  d e g r e e s  o f f r e e d om ; * * i nd ica tes  s ign i f icant  a t th e  1  O h  level ,  * a t 
th e  5 O r 6  level ,  #  a t th e  1  O ”/6  leve l  u s i n g  2  ta i l  tests, x ind ica tes  s ign i f icant  a t th e  1  O ”h  
leve l  u s i n g  a  1  ta i l  test on ly.  F i gu r es  i n  b rackets  a r e  t r a tios. T h e r e  was  n o  
e v i d ence  o f s ign i f icant  first o r d e r  a u toco r re la t i on .  
( 2 )  0  =  o u tp u t; N t- 1  =  l a g g e d  e m p l o ymen t; t =  tim e  t rend;  D  =  b i na r y  va r iab le ;  X 1  
=  D 1  x l o g 0  e xcep t fo r  R M  w h e r e  =  r ea l  w a g e s ; X 2  =  9  x Io g Q . 
( 3 )  Fo r  H M S O  th e  d u m m y  va r i ab l e  is l a g g e d  to  1 9 8 2 . S e e  d iscuss ion  i n  text. 
S o u r c e : Pa r k e r  a n d  Ha r tley, 1 9 9 1  a , T ab l e  3 , p  4 1 2 . 














































0.5 -2.4 -1.3 -0.8 
0.2 -5.0 -3.3 -1.0 
7.1 -3.5 3.8 -3.2 
-6.3 -3.6 -8.5 -6.9 






9.6 2.5 8.9 1.8 7.6 -1.2 
6.3 1.2 3.4 1.3 6.6 4.5 
4.0 -4.4 -8.1 -5.6 
-1.5 -4.8 -0.4 -3.6 
n.a. n.a. 
2.2 a.4 -2.0 -1.6 
8.6 -1.0 9.7 0.2 
n.a. n.a. 
-0.6 -1.5 -3.8 -2.7 
a.1 -4.4 -1.3 -3.2 
a.5 4.9 -5.7 -3.8 
7.2 4.8 + * 
n.a. n.a 
-10.4 -5.6 -13.6 -6.9 -11.1 4.0 
10.6 2.5 9.9 1.8 8.6 -1.2 
4.0 0.1 -0.9 -3.2 2.4 -2.0 
-1.2 -3.0 4.0 -1.3 0.1 1.9 
4.0 -1.8 0.5 2.2 0.9 A.2 
-0.7 -0.6 -3.5 
5.0 0.3 -0.2 
5.8 0.4 02 
3.7 1.0 -0.3 
5.7 3.6 0.5 















Source: Hartley, Parker and Martin, 1991, Table 3, p 56. 
TABLE 4: Notes: 
* Privatisation distorts public corporation figures in this period, therefore results not 
reported. 
(1) Figures show difference, in percentage points, between an organisation’s average 
annual productivity growth and the corresponding national average figure 
(organisation - UK). 
(2) LP = average annual growth in labour productivity (%). 
TFP = average annual growth in total factor productivity (76). 
(3 Figures based upon output deflated by each organisation’s nearest own price 
deflator or a physical output series where available. 
a 1983-85 only. 
n.a not applicable, service industry. 














change in the 
Value stocks Bnd 
Profitability added Net debtors ratios 














n/a: not available 
1970 Improved No change No change No change No change No change 
lY84 improved Detcrioratcd No change Improved No change No change 
1980 Improved Deteriorated Dctcrioratcd No change lmprovcd n/a 





lY6Y n/a Dcterioratcd lmprovcd No change 
1969 Improved n/a lmprovcd Dctcriorated No change No change 
1980 lmprovcd No change No change No change lmprovcd lmprovcd 
1971 improved lmprovcd lmprovcd No change lmprovcd lmprovcd 
lY74 lmprovcd nla No change lmprovcd lmprovcd lmprovcd 
1977 No change n/a lmprovcd No change No change No change 
1981 Dctcrioratcd No change No change No change No change No change 







Source: Parker and Hartley, 1991 b, Table 5, p 640. 
OWNERSHIP STATUS AND PERFORMANCE - DID PERFORMANCE CHANGE AS EXPECTED? I 
Financial 
Ratios 
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